NIETZSCHE AS A PROPONENT OF COMMUNAL FLOURISHING: THE OVERMAN AS A VEHICLE TO IDEALIZED POLITICS, COMMUNITY, AND FRIENDSHIP

Matt Bush

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche aimed to present his philosophy in a way that could guide the creation of a new myth as an antidotal response to the collapse of religion as a source of human meaning. "Without myth," Nietzsche claims, "all cultures lose their healthy, creative, natural energy..." To Nietzsche, the creative ability of humanity is something that should be pushed in the pursuit of human flourishing, both personal and communal. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche writes,

I name you three metamorphoses of the spirit: how the spirit shall become a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child...The weight bearing spirit takes upon itself all the heaviest things: like a camel hurrying laden into the desert...But in the loneliest desert the second metamorphosis occurs: the spirit here becomes a lion; it wants to capture freedom and be lord in its own desert...To create new values — even the lion is incapable of that: but to create itself freedom for new creation — that the might of the lion can do...But tell me, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion cannot?...The child is innocence

³⁶ Maudemarie Clark and Monique Wonderly, "The Good of Community," in *Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philoso-phy*, ed. Julian Young (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 118-140.

and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes...The spirit now will *its own will*...³⁷

Here, Nietzsche tells the story of the liberation of a spirit from the blunting and conforming influence of the masses in the creation of his ideal "overman." While the retaliation of the lion against an imposed social narrative is an individual act of power, it is unclear what the nature of community is in Nietzsche's understanding of the child. Is there any room for community in the story Nietzsche tells? Is there room for embracing communal bonds and shared action in Nietzsche's encouragement of self-overcoming? Can Nietzsche be read with an understanding of the step "becoming the child" as the third step in a larger process?

In this paper, I will evaluate the possibility of a step *after* becoming the child; a fourth step that involves a return to communal life. Reminiscent of Kierkegaard's return to finite humanity described in the "second movement of faith" in his "religious" mode of living, this step would involve recognition and development of one's own selfhood and a subsequent return to reality.³⁸ Where Kierkegaard's return involves a coming back to finitude and departure from the obsession with the ideal characteristic of his "ethical" mode of living, I will argue that Nietzsche's return involves a coming back to the community one had to separate from in order to become the overhuman. To articulate this "next step" or "fourth metamorphosis," I will turn to Nietzsche's ideas of the overhuman, his ideal politics and communities, and his conception of the meaning of friendship. Ultimately, I will contend that

2

³⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," in *The Nietzsche Reader*, ed. Keith Pearson and Duncan Large. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 263.

³⁸ Kierkegaard, Soren. "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," in *The Essential Kierkegaard*, ed. Howard Hong and Edna Hong. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 234.

Nietzsche's metamorphoses towards the creation of child-hood and his encouragement of self-overcoming into the meaning making of the overhuman are connected to his vision of idealized communities. By building off recent scholarship around community, politics, and friendship in Nietzsche's philosophy, I argue for a value held by Nietzsche in community that can be easily missed amidst the encouragements of independence. This paper connects the ideas of various Nietzsche scholars to make room for a lived practice of Nietzschean overcoming that extends beyond the third metamorphosis, a continuation into communal living.

The reading of Nietzsche as a proponent of community is not a new interpretation. There has been significant scholarship that evaluates Nietzsche's thoughts on community from various angles. For example, a more recent and more comprehensive work on the tension between individuality and community is Julian Young's anthology entitled *Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy*.³⁹

Nietzsche's encouragement to invest in one's own humanity and overcome oneself does not exist in a vacuum, but rather is a response to the dulling and standardizing forces of the masses. His writings can, thus, largely be understood as a reaction to the inadequacies of modern community. His encouragement of self-overcoming is not only geared toward a correction of the personal but a correction of the communal. Julian Young's essay, "Nietzsche: The Long View," in his anthology understands this. ⁴⁰ For Young, Nietzsche sees overmen as the most fit to lead humanity into the future. In discussing "free spirits" Nietzsche states that the most powerful of them, arguably the ones closest to being the overman, are the "seed-bearers of the future," the creators of "new life-possibilities to weigh against the old ones..."

³⁹ Julian Young, "Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy," (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
⁴⁰ Ibid., 7-30.

⁴¹ Ibid., 25.

This goal of creating new possibilities for the future implies the relevance and importance of community. Why would an individual focus on changing the future if the future is external and shared? Self-overcoming can be done in solitude. "new life-possibilities" cannot. Reading Nietzsche this way, the journey to the overman is not finished with full individual power. An overman is made even more powerful if their path includes being an agent of historical change. In fact, according to Young, Nietzsche sees this act towards change as a source of meaning and happiness. He writes that "the free spirit, too, derives his meaning and happiness from the community, although not in the same way that 'most people' do."42 Where most people are made happy by conforming to the herd, the overman or free spirit is made happy by shaping community and redefining the future. Young writes, "the free spirit is valuable because he enables the community to survive and thrive."43 If Young is right about this value or purpose of the overman, then overcoming, as such, cannot be understood as the "last step" in the progression of metamorphoses. Young describes the role of the overman as someone dedicated to community yet still removed from it. I assert that while Nietzsche's overman should be read as highly independent, there are elements that bring them back to communal life.

Nietzsche's criticism of the communal herd as "conforming and uncritical" and his appraisal of exceptional individuals for their ability to shape the norms conformed to by the herd informs major interpretations of his writings. 44 It is tempting to understand this distinction as a binary made of two extremes. As political scientist and philosopher, Jill Hargiss, points out, "all individuals are members of social groups," which blurs the line between an individual's wholly

⁴² Julian Young, "The Long View," 27.

⁴³ Ibid., 25.

⁴⁴ Bertrand Russel, A History of Western Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1947), 796.

original ideas and their social influences. Through, "exposing the dichotomy between the authentic or free individual and the conforming masses as a binarism," Hargiss aims to embrace context and avoid sweeping judgements. 145 As the interpretive dichotomy between "herd" and overman is loosened, a better understanding of Nietzsche's perspectivism demonstrates a more accessible, albeit no less difficult, path to the overman, allowing for any "herd" member to overcome themselves and become a genuine individual. Loosening the dichotomy between *either* living in community or in solitude allows a blending of the two ideas that I argue allows to understand Nietzsche's encouragements toward overcoming in light of possible communal life, in light of a fourth metamorphosis.

Understanding perspectivism is an important step in appreciating Nietzsche's reasons for rejecting the abundant conformity of community. In an essay entitled *Knowing Limits: Toward a Versatile Perspectivism with Nietzsche*, *Heidegger, Zhuangzi and Zen*, Bret Davis cites an excerpt of Nietzsche critiquing physicists that demonstrates his understanding of perspectivism:

Physicists believe in a "true world" in their own fashion...But they are in error. The atom they posit is inferred according to the logic of the perspectivism of consciousness—and it is therefore itself a subjective fiction...precisely this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every center of force—and not only man—construes all the rest of the world from

⁴⁵ Hargis, Jill. "From Demonization of the Masses to Democratic Practice in the Work of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault." *Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences* 34.4 (2011): 373–92.

its own viewpoint, i.e., measures, feels, forms, according to its own force...⁴⁶

Davis explains that the tendency for community to establish a set of "Truths," moral, metaphysical, etc. ignores the inescapable perspectival nature of truth inherent to the human experience. Nietzsche encourages his readers to embrace their own human nature, rather than denying it. By ascribing to social "Truths" individuals are limited by failing to participate in their own definition of truth, something that can be inferred to be part of human nature to Nietzsche. Nietzsche's push against this limiting socialization is not a *rejection of others*, but rather an active investment in developing an unadulterated perspective and an *embracing of the self*. I argue that this exceptional individuality is accessible to all and can coexist with a robust community focused on human flourishing.

The core of Nietzsche's encouragement involves removing oneself from social influences and expressing one's strength by making one's own meaning and defining one's own humanity. The external dynamics surrounding the overhuman expressed by Nietzsche's ideal politics and communities demonstrate an embracing and mutual strengthening between the overman and their community. In his writing *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, Nietzsche discusses the ideal of a "free spirit" that is very similar to the ideal of the overman and of the child. Nietzsche writes in *Human*, *All Too Human* that a free spirit "thinks differently from what, on the basis of his origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the

⁴⁶ Davis, Bret W. "Knowing Limits: Toward a Versatile Perspectivism with Nietzsche, Heidegger, Zhuangzi and Zen." *Research in Phenomenology* 49.3 (2019): 303-304.

basis of the dominant views of the age, would have been expected of him..."47 Nietzsche's free spirit ideal is a reaction of the tendency he attributes to politics of restricting our freedom and limiting human creativity. In the political sphere it is necessary to develop self-awareness, historical understanding, and discipline in the active study of what an individual "simply fails to understand about himself." Discipline and freedom are not typically associated with each other. Reading it this way, the freedom of a free spirit becomes less of a whimsical non-commitment and more of an active control of one's own thinking in the face of influence. This type of selfcontrol is characteristic of one who has made the journey of self-overcoming. So, becoming an overhuman is a prerequisite to *maximally* effective political engagement. Professor Leslie Paul Thiele sees the process of self-overcoming a political process in itself, but one of an internal politics. His paper The Politics of the Soul takes Nietzsche's rejection of modern politics and argues that it is replaced by an internal form of the "struggle, power, domination and rule...and search for organic unity."49 This process is self-evidently an internal one, making it difficult to differentiate power-seeking politics from human flourishing-focused politics. Nietzsche understands the difficulty that comes with walking the line between competition in leading to more enthusiastic creation and senseless and directionless political competition seeking nothing more than power. While Nietzsche's politics do involve a hierarchy of power, the goal of politics is not a

-

⁴⁷ Fortier, Jeremy. "Nietzsche's Political Engagements: On the Relationship between Philosophy and Politics in 'The Wanderer and His Shadow." Review of Politics 78.2 (2016): 209.

⁴⁸ Fortier, Jeremy. "Philosophy and Politics," 211.

⁴⁹ Thiele, Leslie Paul. "The Politics of the Soul: Heroic Individualism in the Thought of Friedrich Nietzsche," January 1989, 2.

mere expression of that power but rather the "creative invention of values..." Where the power-lust of current politics undermines the aims of the individual by not allowing him to serve "his own domain," Nietzsche's ideal politics would embrace the creation of leaders who have overcome themselves and their socialization and become overhumans. ⁵¹ While this method is certainly not egalitarian in its hierarchy, it holds as a goal the betterment of society for all members.

Nietzsche believes that world history has no intrinsic meaning, and instead meaning is created and given to the world through human action. Human efforts of nationalism and war are distinctly less meaningful to him than efforts of culture creation which bring ideological diversity to what meaning can be. With the evolution of the will to power, human life became capable of more creation and communal control than ever. In evaluation of this will to power, Nietzsche only supports it as natural when it is "building and establishing new forms."52 Condemning violent or destructive manifestations of power, Nietzsche emphasizes that nature is "attempting to achieve" creation through humanity. While rejecting the meaning making humanity enforces on the world, he seems to leave space in his writing for a "purpose" of nature being a flourishing of human creative power. Modern politics is abundant with the will to power for power's sake. Nietzsche sees ideal politics as being shaped by individuals who have overcome themselves toward both the creation of

⁵⁰ Hans Sluga, "The Time is Coming when One will have to Relearn about Politics," in Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy, ed. Julian Young (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 36.

⁵¹ Ibid., 45.

⁵² Metzger, Jeffrey. "The Rise of Politics and Morality in Nietzsche's 'Genealogy': From Chaos to Conscience." *Review of Politics* 83.1 (2021): 151.

new human possibilities and the cultivation of more overhumans. By understanding the final metamorphosis of a return to community with childlike creativity, the goal of self-overcoming can be extended towards the overcoming of politics as a whole towards the cultivation of human flourishing.

The ideal nature of communal dynamics consists of how individuals participating in a community view each other, interact with each other, and are motivated. Kathleen Higgins' essay "Festivals of Recognition: Nietzsche's Idealized Communities" evaluates various positive conceptions of community in Nietzsche's philosophy to present what his ideal would look like. In assessment of communities, Nietzsche often argues that community functions as a herd who "may congregate," but "are not an organic community. They are a collection of self-satisfied dolts who crave status, pleasure, and influence without aspiring to improve themselves..."53 This negative view is not necessary of communities but is rather a product of a population of individuals unmotivated to overcome themselves. If a group of Nietzschean "children" or overhumans came together to form a community, is it necessary that they would devolve into "self-satisfied dolts" simply because they are communing? If a community of overhumans were constructed, how would they engage with each other? In *Homer's Contest*, Nietzsche states that "there are always several geniuses, spurring each other to action, even as they hold each other within the limits of measure."54 Higgins aligns with this agonistic, or competition-oriented, community, seeing the possibility of natural human aggression being directed towards the production and

⁵³ Kathleen Higgins, "Festivals of Recognition: Nietzsche's Idealized Communities," in Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy, ed. Julian Young (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 80.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 85.

advancement of human possibilities, enriching both the individual and community.⁵⁵ Nietzsche views human aggression as natural and unavoidable, encouraging humanity to direct that aggression towards productive flourishing instead of senseless power-seeking.⁵⁶ It is important to understand that the purpose of an agonistic community is competition towards *creation*.

The capacity for humans to become artists, pushing the limits of their creative power, is a tremendous potential method of meaning making. In discussion of the loss of myth's detriment to society that came with the death of religion, he writes "One must will illusions – that is what is tragic," continuing to ask, "might not art perhaps itself be capable of creating a religion, or giving birth to a myth?" With the loss of God, as Nietzsche argues has already come, humanity is left with a crisis of meaning. In *The Gay Science*, when discussing the death of God, he states that humanity must invent new "festivals of atonement and sacred games" to fill the meaning vacuum. ⁵⁸ In another work he asks,

What do all our art of artworks matter if we lose the higher art, the art of festivals? Formerly all artworks were displayed on the great festival road of humanity as commemoration and memorials of high and happy moments.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Ibid., 86.

⁵⁶ Hans Sluga, "The Time is Coming,"

⁵⁷ Ken Gennes and Chris Sykes, "The Culture of Myth," *Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy*, ed. Julian Young (New York,: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 70.

⁵⁸ Julian Young, "Individuality and Community," 18.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Just as the individual act of creating art is brought to one's community in the form of festival, Nietzsche sees the individual journey of self-overcoming as being shared through celebration between community members. This excerpt makes an important distinction between the *creation* of new values, achieved through individual self-overcoming, and the *sharing* of those values, achieved only though community. Nietzsche here holds the communing and celebrating around the creative acts of the overman as a higher goal than the acts themselves.

That said, how can we return to the art of festivals if the historical subject of our festivals, namely God, has been murdered? By coming together not to celebrate God, but to celebrate our shared human undertaking of self-overcoming in a "festival of recognition." 60 As Higgins writes, this new myth "combines articulation of individuality and insight to the point that one finds kinship everywhere with the common quest for a more perfect humanity that transcends the distinction between individual and community."61 Where our current communities embrace homogeneity and simplify human values down to the point where no internal work is necessary to participate in a seemingly meaningful way, Nietzsche's ideal community lets go of the stories limiting our communities and embraces the creative power characteristic of humanity towards new values and new definitions of being human. Despite the clear value Nietzsche views the communal celebrations of human self-overcoming and definition with, the journey of becoming the overman remains at its core a solitary one. In describing what the communication between overmen would look like, Nietzsche describes, "each giant,"

-

⁶⁰ Kathleen Higgins, "Festivals of Recognition," 91.

⁶¹ Ibid.

[overman] "calling to his brother through the desolate intervals of time." Overmen must maintain their exceptional individuality and not let communal bonds bring them back into mediocrity and conformity. The nature of communal interactions is made clearer with an understanding of the value Nietzsche attributes to friendship.

In the Gay Science, Nietzsche defines friendship as "a shared thirst for an ideal," as an opportunity to inspire one another into a "yearning for the Overman." 63 The ability for friends to push each other towards their own individual selfovercoming involves a balance of connection and individuality. While some thinkers argue that the shared ideal or goal of friendship is truth, Willow Verkerk holds that this is a misunderstanding. As I demonstrated with my discussion of perspectivism, Nietzsche conceptualizes truth as largely perspectival and thus a faulty indicator of reality on its own. Understanding Nietzsche's perspectivism makes the benefit of communal interactions possible. If each human has their own version of self-defined truth inherent to their perspective, the sharing of these perspectives is a possibility for ideological synthesis. The life of a hermit leads to ideological stagnation. Nietzsche encourages intentional interaction with one's community, not for the purpose of defining one's identity but for the sake of pushing oneself closer to the overman and for challenging one's own ideology. He encourages the overhuman to embrace complexity, and to leave behind the simple social truth and morality laid out by the masses. This radical refusal of committing to one form of Truth, mirroring William James's radical empiricism, can be argued as a reason for collaboration. If every individual has their own perspective meaning and truth, the exchange of these perspectives without an imposition of them onto each other would be

⁶² Ken Gennes and Chris Sykes, "The Culture of Myth," 75.

⁶³ Verkerk, Willow. "Nietzsche's Goal of Friendship." *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 45.3 (2014): 279-280.

deeply productive in the evolution of ideas, not towards truth but towards creation and flourishing.

While Nietzsche can be read as denouncing the modern ways truth is conceived in communities, I find it hard to read his work as a complete advocation for radical solitude. While Nietzsche does praise going into solitude as allowing one to become more "self-oriented...and in doing so also unlearn obeying" it is important to understand the potential dangers of solitude.⁶⁴ Verkerk understands Nietzsche as stating that "In solitude one is likely to repeat the same stories and habits with which one came into solitude...A friend is a possible remedy to this predicament."65 This argument outlines the difference Nietzsche sees between a community of friendship and the more common modern community. Where the modern community of the "herd" or "rabble" is a stagnating and thoughtless influence, friendship has the "potential to interrupt this regular ignorance and thus become a partial remedy to the limitations that one faces during the solitary pursuit of truth."66 In other words, a friend is a companion who is on their own journey and is aware of yours. While these journeys are separate, they are tied together by a mutual devotion to self-overcoming.

In On Love of One's Neighbor, Nietzsche describes "the creating friend" who aids others in their pursuit of their own self-overcoming, stating that ideally this friendship resembles "a festival of the earth and a premonition of the overhuman." Despite renouncing popular sources of meaning, he seems to see the expansion of humanity into "overhumanity" as a meaningful pursuit. Verkerk understands the idea of Redlichkeit, used by Nietzsche in Daybreak, as "passionate knowledge-seeking friendships: bringing attention to

⁶⁴ Verkerk, Willow. "Nietzsche's Goal of Friendship." 286.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 285.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 288.

the lived world "and the potential of human relationships to facilitate change."68 69This understanding of Nietzsche does not see social movements or community as a pointless endeavor, but rather sees a multitude of work on oneself as a prerequisite if the community is to be effectively conducive to the creation and maintenance of the overhuman. Verkerk writes, "...making the goal of friendship the overhuman gives an immanent spiritual meaning to human relationships, one that Nietzsche considers vital for the thriving of the human spirit. Nietzsche's conception of friendship is connected to a broader understanding of human flourishing that emphasizes the passionate and measured pursuit of knowledge in the interest of overcoming and creative reevaluation." Nietzsche understands that the current organization of humanity is not a necessary one. If there is to ever be an intentional restructuring of society to embrace human flourishing above all values, there must first be individuals who see themselves as transcendent of the status quo and embrace their human ability to create new value systems and ways of organizing community. These overhumans, however, must encourage others to pursue the same transcendence and self-overcoming in order to make possible the kinds of "festivals of recognition" Higgins describes. Humanity has the power of choice, but if they see themselves as *defined by* others rather than *sharing* humanity with others this power is gone unused.

Not all friendship reaches the heights described by Verkerk, however. Dana Freibach-Heifetz cites Nietzsche's distinction between "inferior, common friendship and exalted

⁶⁸ Ibid. 290.

⁶⁹ Melissa Lane, "Honesty as the Best Policy: Nietzche on Redlichkeit and the Contrast between the Stoic and Epicurean Strategies of the Self," in *Histories of Postmodernism*, ed. Mark Bevir, Jill Hargis, and Sara Rushing (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 25.

⁷⁰ Verkerk, Willow. "Nietzsche's Goal of Friendship." 290.

or noble friendship."71 Where common friendship is undirected and has more to do with company and the easing of loneliness, exalted friendship is directed at helping the other to overcome himself and become the overhuman. This friendship does not require similarity in personhood, but rather congruence in the nature of one's goal. Nietzsche writes, "what is love but understanding and rejoicing at the fact that another lives, feels, and acts in a way different from and opposite to ours?"⁷² The essence of this friendly love is that it involves intention and work. Nietzsche writes that the love of an "overflowing heart...hath always a complete world to bestow"73. "A complete world" is not something that an individual can attain without devotion to their own self-overcoming. These friends are not dependent on each other, they are wholly independent beings supporting each other in their own becoming. "Fellow rejoicing, not fellow suffering, makes the friend," Nietzsche says.⁷⁴ The friendship Nietzsche envisions is a celebration, a festival of each other's humanity. By seeing each other's humanity and finiteness, the task of self-overcoming becomes something larger shared between the bond of friendship. Not only is this sharing inherently meaningful, but Heifetz argues that a strong bond assists and is "maybe even essential for self-understanding."75

Synthesizing Nietzsche's ideas on friendship, community, politics, and the overhuman depicts the balancing act required to integrate radical individualization with communal celebration and support. Nietzsche's encouragement to overcome oneself is aimed at both the creation of new values and

⁷¹ Freibach-Heifetz, Dana. "Pure Air and Solitude and Bread and Medicine: Nietzsche's Conception of Friendship." *Philosophy Today* 49.3 (2005): 245.

⁷² Ibid. 246.

⁷³ Ibid. 247.

⁷⁴ Ibid. 248.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 252.

the creation of new overhumans. Nietzsche writes, "these new duties are not the duties of a solitary; on the contrary, they set one in the midst of a mighty community..." The task of overcoming is a nuanced one. While the focus of it is radically perspectival, Nietzsche builds friendship, community, and politics around its encouragement and hopes to fill the vacuum of culture left by God's death with the power of radical creativity overhumans can harness. In his work *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche writes,

To climb as high into the pure icy Alpine air as a philosopher ever climbed, up to where all the mist and obscurity cease and where the fundamental constitution of things speaks in a voice rough and rigid but ineluctably comprehensible! *Merely to think of* this makes the soul infinitely solitary; if its wish were fulfilled, however, if its glance once fell upon things straight and bright as a beam of light, if shame, fear and desire died away - what word could then describe the condition it would be in, that new and enigmatic animation without agitation with which it would...lie extended over the tremendous hieroglyphics of existence, over the petrified doctrine of becoming, not as the darkness of night but as the glowing light of dawn streaming out over all the world.⁷⁷ (emphasis added)

This excerpt speaks to the heart of my argument. While the journey of self-overcoming, embarked on by a would-be Nietzschean "child" or overhuman, is necessarily solitary, the benefits of such a journey must be shared and celebrated with the rest of humanity in the creation of a new ideal and the encouragement of all to rise up to their own self-overcoming.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Untimely Meditations," translated by R. J. Hollingdale. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 160.
 Ibid., 159.

The light of humanity's own self-definition shines "out over all the world," resounding into politics, communities, and friendships. While Nietzsche doesn't describe a distinct fourth metamorphosis depicting a return to love of and participation *with* one's community, there is room in his philosophy to read an encouragement for communal devotion in all stages of overhuman development.

Bibliography

- Clark, Maudemarie and Monique Wonderly, "The Good of Community," in *Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy*, edited by Julian Young, 118-140. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Fortier, Jeremy. "Nietzsche's Political Engagements: On the Relationship between Philosophy and Politics in 'The Wanderer and His Shadow." *Review of Politics* 78, no. 2 (March 2016): 201-25.
- Freibach-Heifetz, Dana. "Pure Air and Solitude and Bread and Medicine: Nietzsche's Conception of Friendship." *Philosophy Today* 49, no. 3 (September 2005): 245–55.
- Gennes, Ken and Chris Sykes, "The Culture of Myth," in *Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy*, edited by Julian Young, 51-76. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Hargis, Jill. "From Demonization of the Masses to Democratic Practice in the Work of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault." *Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences* 34, no. 4 (November 2011): 373-92.
- Higgins, Kathleen. "Festivals of Recognition: Nietzsche's Idealized Communities," in *Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy*, edited by Julian Young, 77-92. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

- Kierkegaard, Soren, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," in *The Essential Kierkegaard*, edited by Howard Hong and Edna Hong. 234. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1997.
- Lane, Melissa. "Honesty as the Best Policy: Nietzche on Redlichkeit and the Contrast between the Stoic and Epicurean Strategies of the Self, in Histories of Postmodernism." in *Histories of Postmodernism*, ed. Mark Bevir, Jill Hargis, and Sara Rushing New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.
- Metzger, Jeffrey. *The Rise of Politics and Morality in Nie-tzsche's 'Genealogy': From Chaos to Conscience*. Review of Politics 83, no. 1 (December 1, 2021): 149–52.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Untimely Meditations*, translated by R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Sluga, Hans. "The Time is Coming when One will have to Relearn about Politics," in *Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy*, edited by Julian Young, 31-50. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Thiele, Leslie Paul. *The Politics of the Soul: Heroic Individu*alism in the Thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Verkerk, Willow. *Nietzsche's Goal of Friendship*. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 45, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 279–91.
- Young, Julian. "The Long View," in *Individuality and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy*, edited by Julian

Young, 7-30. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.