Can Funding Anti-Poaching Patrols with Ivory Stockpile Sales Save the African Elephant?
Presenter(s)
Matthew H Holden
Abstract
African elephant populations are threatened due to illegal poaching for ivory. Many countries have confiscated ivory through the enforcement of illegal wildlife trade bans and therefore have accumulated large ivory stockpiles. Such stockpiles pose a conservation dilemma. Should these countries sell their ivory and use the money to fund conservation (e.g. enforcement of anti-poaching laws)? To determine the effect of funding anti-poaching enforcement with ivory stockpile sales, on elephant population dynamics, we modelled the harvest of elephants as an open access resource, where poachers increase or decrease harvest effort based on profitability. We find, through a global sensitivity analysis, that selling ivory stockpiles is unlikely to provide enough funding to increase anti-poaching patrols to the level required to prevent elephant population declines. This suggests that either we must prioritize new, more cost effective management actions, or generate additional funding for elephant conservation beyond the funds that could be created by selling ivory stockpiles. Since limited conservation budgets make the later unlikely, we recommend that managers and conservation scientists focus their research on the cost-efficacy of engaging communities in management and gathering intelligence rather than on the ground anti-poaching patrols.
Topic
Economics
Start Date
6-17-2016 9:10 AM
End Date
6-17-2016 9:30 AM
Room
High Country Conference Center
Recommended Citation
Holden, Matthew H.; Biggs, Duan; Brink, Henry; Rhodes, Jonathan; and McDonald-Madden, Eve, "Can Funding Anti-Poaching Patrols with Ivory Stockpile Sales Save the African Elephant?" (2016). World Conference on Natural Resource Modeling. 15.
https://scholarexchange.furman.edu/rma/all/presentations/15
Can Funding Anti-Poaching Patrols with Ivory Stockpile Sales Save the African Elephant?
High Country Conference Center
African elephant populations are threatened due to illegal poaching for ivory. Many countries have confiscated ivory through the enforcement of illegal wildlife trade bans and therefore have accumulated large ivory stockpiles. Such stockpiles pose a conservation dilemma. Should these countries sell their ivory and use the money to fund conservation (e.g. enforcement of anti-poaching laws)? To determine the effect of funding anti-poaching enforcement with ivory stockpile sales, on elephant population dynamics, we modelled the harvest of elephants as an open access resource, where poachers increase or decrease harvest effort based on profitability. We find, through a global sensitivity analysis, that selling ivory stockpiles is unlikely to provide enough funding to increase anti-poaching patrols to the level required to prevent elephant population declines. This suggests that either we must prioritize new, more cost effective management actions, or generate additional funding for elephant conservation beyond the funds that could be created by selling ivory stockpiles. Since limited conservation budgets make the later unlikely, we recommend that managers and conservation scientists focus their research on the cost-efficacy of engaging communities in management and gathering intelligence rather than on the ground anti-poaching patrols.