Modelling a Tradable Development Rights Market in Fragmented Brazilian Forests
Presenter(s)
Kate J. Helmstedt
Abstract
Recent changes to the Brazilian Forest Code allow landholders to buy and sell the rights to clear native habitat to comply with legal reserve requirements. While this Tradable Development Rights (TDR) framework may prevent continued overall native habitat area loss, the spatial pattern of reserved areas will likely be shifted, creating novel landscape patterns. Altering the fragmentation and connectivity of the remaining native habitat will likely have significant effects on native biodiversity. To explore the likely conservation implications of the revised Forest Code, we investigate how a TDR changes biodiversity conservation outcomes compared with enforced individual compliance. Using a simulation model and graph theory metrics, we find that the TDR market results in uniformly better outcomes for biodiversity and agriculture, resulting in more connected habitat networks with larger fragments and fewer edge effects. However, if deforestation is unlikely to continue up to the legal limit on over-compliant properties the TDR market is less beneficial and is harmful in some scenarios. We conclude that in landscapes where native habitat loss is likely to continue such as Brazil, trading development rights markets create better outcomes for biodiversity conservation than mandating individual reserve requirements.
Topic
Economics
Start Date
6-17-2016 8:10 AM
End Date
6-17-2016 8:30 AM
Room
High Country Conference Center
Recommended Citation
Helmstedt, Kate and Potts, Matthew D., "Modelling a Tradable Development Rights Market in Fragmented Brazilian Forests" (2016). World Conference on Natural Resource Modeling. 21.
https://scholarexchange.furman.edu/rma/all/presentations/21
Modelling a Tradable Development Rights Market in Fragmented Brazilian Forests
High Country Conference Center
Recent changes to the Brazilian Forest Code allow landholders to buy and sell the rights to clear native habitat to comply with legal reserve requirements. While this Tradable Development Rights (TDR) framework may prevent continued overall native habitat area loss, the spatial pattern of reserved areas will likely be shifted, creating novel landscape patterns. Altering the fragmentation and connectivity of the remaining native habitat will likely have significant effects on native biodiversity. To explore the likely conservation implications of the revised Forest Code, we investigate how a TDR changes biodiversity conservation outcomes compared with enforced individual compliance. Using a simulation model and graph theory metrics, we find that the TDR market results in uniformly better outcomes for biodiversity and agriculture, resulting in more connected habitat networks with larger fragments and fewer edge effects. However, if deforestation is unlikely to continue up to the legal limit on over-compliant properties the TDR market is less beneficial and is harmful in some scenarios. We conclude that in landscapes where native habitat loss is likely to continue such as Brazil, trading development rights markets create better outcomes for biodiversity conservation than mandating individual reserve requirements.